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W. C. Sullivan
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 3740-85
12 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

FROM:

[redacted]
Executive Secretary

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SUBJECT:

Combat Intelligence Analysis Report [redacted]

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1. The attached report was approved by the CIPC on 25 March 1985 and copies have been forwarded to the DCI and Director, National Security Agency. We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your support and assistance in the preparation of this report. [redacted]

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2. As the comments around the table indicated, this issue embraces a wide range of intelligence and defense questions, all of which have budgetary and resource implications. It will bear close scrutiny by the Intelligence Community as the intelligence structure to support our military commanders in the field is being implemented. [redacted]

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Attachment: As stated

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

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SUBJECT: Combat Intelligence Analysis Report

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Distribution: DCI/ICS 3740-85, w/Attachment

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Director of
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Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
A TASK FORCE REPORT

25 March 1985

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BACKGROUND

In response to a request from the Director, National Security Agency (NSA), the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) initiated a "fast-track" study to examine the current evolution of all-source combat intelligence analytic capabilities. The DIRNSA expressed his concern that this evolution was proceeding in a non-coherent fashion with, in most instances, a predilection toward forward area processing and analysis. [REDACTED]

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The CIPC formed a small task force comprised of representatives from both the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense (DoD), several of whom have been directly involved over the past several years in the development of the intelligence architecture needed to support the theater commander's warfighting intelligence needs. [REDACTED]

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It became clear in the task force's discussions that it would be both difficult and impractical, in the time allotted for the report, to determine whether or not proper consideration is being given to specific theater analytic capabilities as well as to those of CONUS and other centralized analytic centers. The task force also determined that it was outside the scope of this study to examine in depth either the collection programs that are intended to support the theater commanders or related budgetary/resource issues. The task force concluded, however, that it could effectively address what appeared to be one of the DIRNSA's principal concerns, i.e., the coordinating process by which the combat intelligence analysis structure is determined. [REDACTED]

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To focus on this question, the task force restricted its review to 1) the Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP) being developed under the sponsorship of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) by the Unified and Specified Commands (U&S) and, 2) the methodologies upon which the various sub-architecture efforts are based. The USEUCOM TIAP served as the model for discussions.

Attached at Appendix II are the original Terms of Reference for the Combat Intelligence Analysis Task Force and a listing of its membership. [REDACTED]

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CONCLUSIONS

- The Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP) provides an active, practical process for defining and coordinating theater commanders' needs for combat intelligence. The development and implementation of the TIAP is a DoD responsibility.
- Combat intelligence analysis support depends essentially on a clear understanding of the military commander's intelligence needs to support his warfighting mission.
- National intelligence program managers need to understand operational doctrine and warfighting concepts.
- Theater commanders need to understand how national systems are tasked and priorities determined.
- DIA serves as the focal point at the national level for compiling and integrating theater issues concerning combat intelligence analysis support.
- A consistent methodology is needed for all theater intelligence architectures.
- Combat intelligence analysis support, whether theater or CONUS based, is highly dependent on wartime availability of communications.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

- The CIPC not undertake a detailed study of the combat intelligence analysis issue; the issue is more appropriate for DoD consideration and review.
- The DIA continue to ensure that the methodologies used to develop intelligence architectures are consistent and are based on warfighting doctrine and concepts.
- The DIA work to ensure that national perspectives, the views of national intelligence program managers as well as technical personnel familiar with combat environment problems, are considered at an early stage in the TIAP process.
- The DIA continue to monitor closely the TIAP process to ensure that an optimal mix of analytic capabilities is established between theater and CONUS facilities.
- The DIA continue to address, within the TIAP process, the availability of communications used for combat intelligence analysis support.
- Consistent and improved programmatic support be provided to DIA to accomplish the TIAP effort.

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COMBAT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TASK FORCE

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	HQDA/DAMI-ISP Rm 2B457 Pentagon	
	NSA, P2 Ft. Meade, MD	
	SSO DIA, Rm 1D884, Pentagon DASD(I) (Rm 3C200, Pentagon)	
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